Project for New American Century
Dois novos memorandos, enviados hoje:
September 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS
FROM: ELLEN BORK, Deputy Director
SUBJECT: East Asian Democracies
Two of America’s allies in Asia are seeking a democratic mandate from their citizens to make changes with major strategic consequences.
Taiwan wants to submit nuclear power and other questions to a referendum. Experience with a referendum would prove important when a decision on Taiwan’s future and the wishes of its people regarding a relationship with China can no longer be put off. Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan correctly seeks revision of the country’s pacifist constitution which limits Japan’s participation both in regional and global security. (“Constitution Key Poll Issue,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 27, 2003.) A new role for Japan in international affairs brings up questions about its imperial past. A change in Taiwan’s circumstances is inevitable due both to the threat posed to Taiwan by China, and Taiwan’s own democratic transformation.
These and other changes in the region require new strategic thinking. Unlike Europe, Asia does not have an alliance structure uniting democracies in a common purpose to guarantee the peace. Such an organization would be extremely useful to democratic allies that are, like Japan and Taiwan, making momentous changes. South Korea, for another example, would benefit from dealing with its immediate challenges in a broader, regional context, much as West Germany did by balancing its relations with the East against obligations and common values of the West.
It may not be possible or effective to continue making small adjustments to the old web of bilateral alliances the region has had since World War II. Nor do the existing multilateral organizations work particularly well, or advance the interests of the region’s democracies and their ally, the United States.
The significance of the strategic changes underway in the region must not be overlooked. Nor should the way in which two of America’s strongest democratic allies are going about them.
MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS
FROM: GARY SCHMITT
SUBJECT: More Troops in Iraq
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that, on the security front in Iraq, “it seems to me that the trajectory we’re on is a good one.” But it is hard to find anyone else who agrees with that assessment. Certainly not the British – who now are thinking about increasing their force levels in Iraq. Certainly not the Shiites – who, for lack of security, are now discussing how to reconstitute their own militias. Certainly not even U.S. commanders – who, if you listen carefully to what they are saying, admit that there are not enough front-line troops to handle what needs to be done in Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld’s response is that we need to turn things over to the Iraqis as soon as possible. Sounds fine in theory or even over the long run. Yet there is no way to train a large, effective and loyal Iraqi force in the time frame required. Despite this reality, the secretary resists any idea that more U.S. troops are needed.
In doing so, Secretary Rumsfeld puts the president’s policy of building a decent and democratic Iraq at risk. At the moment, there are only three alternatives: one, we don’t add troops and risk not being able both to provide security in Iraq and conduct the kind of counterinsurgency operations required to root out our adversaries; two, we add even more foreign troops only after giving over Iraq’s management to the UN, thereby inviting the dysfunction of the UN into the process of rebuilding Iraq; or three, we augment the size of U.S. forces there, increasing even more the overall burden on the American military. Unattractive as this last alternative might be, it is the only dependable way to secure the president’s vision for Iraq.
Nor is it impossible. The recent Congressional Budget Office study, which was widely reported as suggesting that we cannot sustain American troop levels in Iraq for much longer without breaking the Army, also makes it clear that it would be possible in the months ahead to add forces if we were willing to call on combat elements from the Marines, the National Guard and Special Forces equivalents. To be sure, this would be a difficult decision for the Pentagon and the White House to make and would call into question previous judgments by the administration about the proper size of the American military.
But the reality remains that, while the situation in Iraq is not as dire as many of the president’s most fearsome critics suggest, we do face a serious security problem there. With a sound strategy and adequate resources, it can be addressed. However, it can’t be if we pretend the problem doesn’t exist or ask others to carry out tasks that only the U.S. and its allies can reliably accomplish.
Dois novos memorandos, enviados hoje:
September 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS
FROM: ELLEN BORK, Deputy Director
SUBJECT: East Asian Democracies
Two of America’s allies in Asia are seeking a democratic mandate from their citizens to make changes with major strategic consequences.
Taiwan wants to submit nuclear power and other questions to a referendum. Experience with a referendum would prove important when a decision on Taiwan’s future and the wishes of its people regarding a relationship with China can no longer be put off. Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan correctly seeks revision of the country’s pacifist constitution which limits Japan’s participation both in regional and global security. (“Constitution Key Poll Issue,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 27, 2003.) A new role for Japan in international affairs brings up questions about its imperial past. A change in Taiwan’s circumstances is inevitable due both to the threat posed to Taiwan by China, and Taiwan’s own democratic transformation.
These and other changes in the region require new strategic thinking. Unlike Europe, Asia does not have an alliance structure uniting democracies in a common purpose to guarantee the peace. Such an organization would be extremely useful to democratic allies that are, like Japan and Taiwan, making momentous changes. South Korea, for another example, would benefit from dealing with its immediate challenges in a broader, regional context, much as West Germany did by balancing its relations with the East against obligations and common values of the West.
It may not be possible or effective to continue making small adjustments to the old web of bilateral alliances the region has had since World War II. Nor do the existing multilateral organizations work particularly well, or advance the interests of the region’s democracies and their ally, the United States.
The significance of the strategic changes underway in the region must not be overlooked. Nor should the way in which two of America’s strongest democratic allies are going about them.
MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS
FROM: GARY SCHMITT
SUBJECT: More Troops in Iraq
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that, on the security front in Iraq, “it seems to me that the trajectory we’re on is a good one.” But it is hard to find anyone else who agrees with that assessment. Certainly not the British – who now are thinking about increasing their force levels in Iraq. Certainly not the Shiites – who, for lack of security, are now discussing how to reconstitute their own militias. Certainly not even U.S. commanders – who, if you listen carefully to what they are saying, admit that there are not enough front-line troops to handle what needs to be done in Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld’s response is that we need to turn things over to the Iraqis as soon as possible. Sounds fine in theory or even over the long run. Yet there is no way to train a large, effective and loyal Iraqi force in the time frame required. Despite this reality, the secretary resists any idea that more U.S. troops are needed.
In doing so, Secretary Rumsfeld puts the president’s policy of building a decent and democratic Iraq at risk. At the moment, there are only three alternatives: one, we don’t add troops and risk not being able both to provide security in Iraq and conduct the kind of counterinsurgency operations required to root out our adversaries; two, we add even more foreign troops only after giving over Iraq’s management to the UN, thereby inviting the dysfunction of the UN into the process of rebuilding Iraq; or three, we augment the size of U.S. forces there, increasing even more the overall burden on the American military. Unattractive as this last alternative might be, it is the only dependable way to secure the president’s vision for Iraq.
Nor is it impossible. The recent Congressional Budget Office study, which was widely reported as suggesting that we cannot sustain American troop levels in Iraq for much longer without breaking the Army, also makes it clear that it would be possible in the months ahead to add forces if we were willing to call on combat elements from the Marines, the National Guard and Special Forces equivalents. To be sure, this would be a difficult decision for the Pentagon and the White House to make and would call into question previous judgments by the administration about the proper size of the American military.
But the reality remains that, while the situation in Iraq is not as dire as many of the president’s most fearsome critics suggest, we do face a serious security problem there. With a sound strategy and adequate resources, it can be addressed. However, it can’t be if we pretend the problem doesn’t exist or ask others to carry out tasks that only the U.S. and its allies can reliably accomplish.
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