Project for New American Century
September 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS
FROM: DANIEL McKIVERGAN, Deputy Director
SUBJECT: Gerecht on Iraq’s Reconstruction
In the current issue of the Weekly Standard, Reuel Marc Gerecht, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and senior fellow at the Project, argues in his piece (“Premature Iraqification”*) that “creating a legitimate Iraqi government and security force can’t be done overnight.” Moreover, he writes that “Iraqification ought to be a question of degree and speed, not kind” and makes the following points:
“…Iraqification isn’t likely to solve Iraq’s most pressing problems.” If we “move too expeditiously,” the Coalition “may well repeat the great sin of modern Iraqi history by creating security forces before the political system can absorb, socialize, and politically neutralize them.”
“…[E]normous care must be taken in building Iraq’s future armed forces…. However badly the U.S. military wants to share the burden in Iraq, it would be an egregious mistake to have a functioning Iraqi army before the Iraqi people have a constitution, to which Iraqi soldiers must swear their allegiance.”
“[T]he battle for hearts and minds in Iraq is for the United States to lose, not for all-Iraqi security forces to win. The latter have an important role to play in securing their country for a freer, democratic future. But we need to be careful not to put the cart before the horse.”
“The forging of decent new political institutions should be the means by which we transfer power to the Iraqi people and neutralize the forces that want to destroy a democratic Iraq before it is born.”
September 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS
FROM: DANIEL McKIVERGAN, Deputy Director
SUBJECT: Gerecht on Iraq’s Reconstruction
In the current issue of the Weekly Standard, Reuel Marc Gerecht, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and senior fellow at the Project, argues in his piece (“Premature Iraqification”*) that “creating a legitimate Iraqi government and security force can’t be done overnight.” Moreover, he writes that “Iraqification ought to be a question of degree and speed, not kind” and makes the following points:
“…Iraqification isn’t likely to solve Iraq’s most pressing problems.” If we “move too expeditiously,” the Coalition “may well repeat the great sin of modern Iraqi history by creating security forces before the political system can absorb, socialize, and politically neutralize them.”
“…[E]normous care must be taken in building Iraq’s future armed forces…. However badly the U.S. military wants to share the burden in Iraq, it would be an egregious mistake to have a functioning Iraqi army before the Iraqi people have a constitution, to which Iraqi soldiers must swear their allegiance.”
“[T]he battle for hearts and minds in Iraq is for the United States to lose, not for all-Iraqi security forces to win. The latter have an important role to play in securing their country for a freer, democratic future. But we need to be careful not to put the cart before the horse.”
“The forging of decent new political institutions should be the means by which we transfer power to the Iraqi people and neutralize the forces that want to destroy a democratic Iraq before it is born.”
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